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Dordrecht : Springer, c2010

xii, 552 s. ; 25 cm

ISBN 978-90-481-8811-6 (váz.)

Logic, epistemology, and the unity of science ; vol. 17

Obsahuje bibliografii na s. [529]-539, rejstřík

000188286

1 A programme of general semantics 1 // 1.1 The programme in outline 1 // 1.1.1 Semantic schemas 15 // 1.2 The top-down vs. bottom-up approach to logical semantics 23 // 1.2.1 The bottom-up approach 23 // 1.2.2 The top-down approach 35 // 1.3 Foundations of TIL 37 // 1.3.1 Functional approach 37 // 1.3.2 Constructions and types 42 // 1.4 Possible-world intensions vs. extensions 56 // 1.4.1 Epistemic framework 56 // 1.4.2 Intensions and extensions 61 // 1.4.2.1 Classification of empirical properties 64 // 1.4.2.2 The part-whole relation 72 // 1.4.2.3 The top-down approach to semantics revisited 77 // 1.4.3 Logical objects 84 // 1.5 Constructions as structured meanings 95 // 1.5.1 Structured meanings 95 // 1.5.1.1 Analytic vs. logical 103 // 1.5.2 Supposition de dieto and de re vs. reference shift 110 // 1.5.2.1 Two principles de re 118 // 1.5.2.2 Interplay between de dieto and de re 125 // 1.5.3 Important entities and notational conventions: summary 131 // 2 Foundations of semantic analysis 133 // 2.1 A logical method of semantic analysis 133 // 2.1.1 The Parmenides principle 133 // 2.1.2 The compositionality constraint 137 // 2.1.3 Better and worse analyses 141 // 2.2 Concepts as procedural meanings 148 // 2.2.1 Concepts and synonymy 148 // 2.2.2 Concepts and definitions 163 // 2.2.2.1 Ontological definition 163 // 2.2.2.2 Equational verbal definition 164 // 2.2.3 Conceptual system 166 // 2.3 Empirical and mathematical existence 170 // 2.3.1 Existence and extensions 171 // 2.3.2 Existence and intensions 174 // 2.4 Explicit intensionalization and temporal ization 178 // 2.4.1 Anti-actualism 178 // 2.4.2 Predication as functional application 190 // 2.4.3 Montague’s implicit intensionalization 200 // 2.5 Modal and temporal interplay 205 // 2.5.1 Supposition de dieto with respect to temporal parameters 207 // 2.5.2 Tenses and truth-conditions 212 //

2.5.2.1 Simple past 215 // 2.5.2.2 Present perfect 221 // 2.5.2.3 Temporal de dieto vs.de re 223 // 2.5.2.4 Future tenses 226 // 2.6 Three kinds of context 228 // 2.6.1 Using and mentioning constructions 234 // 2.6.2 Intensional and extensional occurrence of constituents 243 // 2.7 TIL as a hyperintensional, partial, typed lambda-calculus 260 // 2.7.1 Substitution and Leibniz’s Law 272 // 3 Singular reference and pragmatically incomplete meaning 279 // 3.1 Definite descriptions 279 // 3.2 Proper names 284 // 3.2.1 Mathematical constants 288 // 3.3 Identities involving descriptions and names 296 // 3.3.1 Hesperus is Phosphorus: co-occupation of individual offices 301 // 3.4 Pragmatically incomplete meanings 311 // 3.4.1 Indexicals 314 // 3.4.2 Indefinite descriptions 319 // 3.5. Anaphora and meaning 323 // 3.5.1 Semantic pre-processing of anaphora 325 // 3.5.2 Donkey sentences 336 // 3.5.3 Dynamic discourse 346 // 3.6 Questions and answers 351 // 4 Requisites: the logic of intensions 359 // 4.1 Requisites defined 360 // 4.2 Intensional essentialism 367 // 4.2.1 Quine’s mathematical cyclist 384 // 4.3 Requisites and substitution in simple sentences 385 // 4.4 Property modification and pseudo-detachment 395 // 4.4.1 Malfunction: subsective vs. privative modification 406 // 4.5 Nomological necessity 411 // 4.6 Counterfactuals 414 // 5 Attitudes and information 421 // 5.1 Propositional attitudes 425 // 5.1.1 Three puzzles and a non-puzzle 427 // 5.1.2 Propositional attitudes de dieto vs. de re 433 // 5.1.2.1 Intensional propositional attitudes de dieto and de re 436 // 5.1.2.2 Hyperintensional propositional attitudes de dicto and de re 441 // 5.1.2.3 Summary of attitudes 447 // 5.1.3 Inconsistent belief 451 // 5.1.4 Knowing whether 453 // 5.1.5 Epistemic closure and inferable knowledge 458 // 5.1.6 Factivity and epistemic shift 469 // 5.2 Notional attitudes 471 //

5.2.1 Wishing and wanting to 475 // 5.2.2 Seeking, finding and looking for 485 // 5.3 Quantifying in 495 // 5.4 Information and inference 506 // 5.4.1 Empirical semantic information and ’the scandal of deduction’ 511 // 5.4.2 Empirical content of sentences 515 // 5.4.3 Analytical content of sentences 516 // 5.4.4 Information content of analytically equivalent sentences 521 // 5.4.5 The Information value of a valid argument 527 // 5.4.5.1 The paradox of inference 527 // Bibliography 529 // Name Index 541 // Subject Index 545