.

0 (hodnocen0 x )

(3) Půjčeno:3x 

BK

1st pub.

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013

xvi, 464 s. ; 24 cm

ISBN 978-0-19-870943-5 (brož.)

Popsáno dle brož. dotisku vydaného v roce 2015

Obsahuje bibliografii na s. [430]-450, bibliografické odkazy a rejstřík

001416895

Preface x // 1 Contingentism and Necessitism i // 1.1 The question i // 1.2 Forms of necessitism 5 // 1.3 Possible Fs 10 // 1.4 Unrestricted generality 14 // 1.5 Necessitism and Meinongianism 18 // 1.6 Actualism and possibilism 22 // 1.7 Identity and distinctness 25 // 1.8 Dying and never being born 28 // 2 The Barcan Formula and its Converse: Early Developments 30 // 2.1 The Barcan Formula 30 // 2.2 The Converse Barcan Formula 37 // 2.3 Ibn-Sina 45 // 2.4 Carnap 46 // 2.5 Barcan Marcus again 60 // 2.6 Prior 64 // 2.7 Truth-value gaps 72 // 2.8 Logical modalities 75 // 3 Possible Worlds Model Theory 81 // 3.1 Kripke 81 // 3.2 Kripke models for normal propositional modal logic 84 // 3.3 Metaphysical universality in propositional modal logic 92 // 3.4 Kripke models for first-order modal logic 119 // 3.5 The Barcan and converse Barcan formulas in Kripkes model theory 124 // 3.6 Metaphysical universality in first-order modal logic 130 // 3.7 Intended inhabited model structures for necessitism 139 // 4 Predication and Modality 148 // 4.1 The being constraint 148 // 4.2 Stalnaker s quantified modal logic with identity: orthodox // semantics 159 // 4.3 Stalnaker s quantified modal logic with identity: unorthodox semantics 163 // 4.4 The significance of Stalnaker’s results 167 // 4.5 Abstraction and the qualified converse Barcan formula 172 // 4.6 Variables and constants in Stalnaker s system 177 // 4.7 Abstraction and the necessity of distinctness 179 // 4.8 Abstraction and necessitism 183 // 4.9 Stalnaker s criterion of representational significance 188 // 5 From First-Order to Higher-Order Modal Logic 195 // 5.1 Methodological preliminaries 195 // 5.2 Lewis and Langford: propositional quantification in modal logic 198 // 5.3 Second-order modal logic in Barcan and Carnap: identity, individual concepts, and semantic uniformity 203 // 5.4 Montagues intensional logic 216 //

5.5 The system MLP of higher-order modal logic 221 // 5.6 Necessitisi and contingentisi versions of MLP 230 // 5.7 The challenge of interpreting higher-order quantification 235 // 5.8 Plural quantification in modal logic 241 // 5.9 Non-plural interpretations of higher-order modal logic 254 // 6 Intensional Comprehension Principles and Metaphysics 262 // 6.1 Comprehension and higher-order necessitism 262 // 6.2 Individuals and their haecceities 267 // 6.3 Non-modal comprehension 277 // 6.4 Non-singular comprehension 282 // 6.5 From properties to propositions 288 // 6.6 Truth in a world and truth of a world 296 // 6.7 Appendix 301 // 7 Mappings between Contingentist and Necessitist Discourse 305 // 7.1 Communication between contingentists and necessitists 305 // 7.2 Mapping contingentist talk to neutral talk 313 // 7.3 Mapping necessitist talk to neutral talk 323 // 7.4 Modalism and anti-modalism 332 // 7.5 The problem of incompossibles 335 // 7.6 Extending the framework to plurals 340 // 7.7 Infinitary languages 352 // 7.8 Further applications 365 // 7.9 Appendix 369 // 8 Consequences of Necessitism 376 // 8.1 The necessary framework of objects 376 // 8.2 Supervenience in question 380 // 8.3 No truthmakers 391 // 8.4 Contingency, change, and difference 403 // Methodological Afterword 423 // Bibliography 430 // Index 451