.

0 (hodnocen0 x )

EB

EB

ONLINE

[Praha] : Karolinum, 2019

1 online zdroj (208 stran)

ISBN 978-80-246-2721-2 (online ; pdf)

ISBN 978-80-246-4241-3 (online ; epub)

ISBN 978-80-246-2024-4 (print)

Zobecnění mikroekonomie (maximalizace pravděpodobnosti přežití subjektu) umožnilo autorům modelovat ekonomickou racionalitu i v oblastech, kde ziskové kriterium není vhodné, jako je přerozdělování, neziskový sektor, pozitivní i negativní externality, centrálně plánovaná ekonomika atd. Tam, kde je ziskové kriterium adekvátní, splývá zobecněné kriterium s maximalizací zisku..

001489539

Foreword 11 // 1. The generalized principle of economic rationality 13 // 1.1 Alternatives to the homo economicus paradigm 1? // 1.2 Minimization of the subjective probability of economic extinction 16 // 1.3 Pareto distribution of the probability of survival 17 // 1.3.1 First order pareto probability distribution 17 // 1.3.2 Second order pareto probability distribution 19 // 1.3.3 General pareto probability distribution 20 // 2. Modelling risk and hedging against it 23 // 2.1 Probability of survival for income as a random variable 26 // 2.2 Formulation of the leningrad casino problem 27 // 2.3 Model of the st. Petersburg paradox 29 // 3 Moral hazard and adverse selection in the context of maximization of the probability of economic survival 37 // 3.1 Principal agent model 38 // 3.1.1 Adverse selection 39 // 3.1.2 Moral hazard 42 // 3.2 Application of generalized microeconomics: maximization of the probability of economic survival // 3.2.1 Threat to the agent due to extinction of the principal // 3.2.2 Adverse selection in the context of probability of survival ?5 // 3.2.3 Moral hazard in the context of probability of survival ?7 // 3.2.? Comparison of the standard homo economicus with a survival probability maximizing agent ?8 // A. The demand function in the insurance market: comparison of maximization of the pareto probability of survival with the von Neumann Morgenstern EU theory and Kahneman Tversky prospect theory 51 // A.1 Insurance in the model of maximization of an agent’s pareto probability of (economic) survival 51 // A.2 Insurance demand in the von Neumann Morgenstern model of maximization of the expected utility of income (EU theory) 56 // A.3 Insurance demand in the Kahneman Tversky model (prospect theory, pt) 62 // A.A Comparison of the demand functions of models a, b, and с (from the previous three sections) 68 //

5. Modelling non profit institutions: the university supply function 73 // 5.1 Economic rationality in the non profit sector 73 // 5.2 An optimization model of university behaviour 75 // 5.3 University supply function 83 // 6. Behaviour of a firm in a centrally planned economy the homo se assecurans model 87 // 6.1 Set of feasible production situations in a centrally planned economy 88 // 6.2 The index planning method and the criterion of a producer in a centrally planned economy 89 // 6.3 Maximization of the absolute reserve 90 // 6a maximization of the relative reserve (i.e. Maximization of the pareto probability of survival in a CPE) 93 // 7 Model of an economy with widespread corporate insolvency 97 // 7.1 The problem of secondary insolvency 97 // 7.2 Models of decision making in an economy with widespread secondary insolvency 99 // 7.2.1 Model a: minimax strategy 102 // 7.2.2 Model b: minimum extinction risk strategy 10? // 8 The producer’s optimum under increasing returns to scale 107 // 8.1 Model a: uniform distributions of the probability of extinction W.R.T. Price 111 // 8.2 Model b: uniform distributions of the probability of extinction W.R.T. Profitability 113 // 8.3 Model c: normal distributions of the probability of extinction W.R.T. Profitability 115 // 9. Models of market allocation of externalities, generalized coase theorem 121 // 9.1 Emissions permit market 121 // 9.2 The coase theorem for negative externalities 123 // 9.2.1 The coase theorem for negative externalities: the case of two producers 12? // 9.2.2 The generalized coase theorem for negative externalities in the context of survival probability maximization 127 // 9.2.3 The coase theorem for the case where a producer harms a consumer 132 // 9.3 The coase theorem for positive externalities 133 // 9.3.1 The generalized coase theorem for positive externalities and agents maximizing their own survival probability 133 //

9.3.2 Single positive externality provider model 13? // 9.3.3 Multiple positive externality providers model 136 // 9 A efficiency of acquisition and transfer of information between agents that depend on each other to survive 138 // 9a.1 Model a: information effect = information acquisition and transfer cost 139 // 9a.2 Model b: information effect < information acquisition and transfer cost 1?2 // 10. Altruism and redistribution increasing the // probability of survival of individuals 1a7 // 10.1 Altruism and belonging to the community 1?7 // 10.2 Redistribution 1a9 // 10.2.1 The supply side of redistribution (the willingness to forgo part of one’s personal prosperity) derived from the social nature of individuals’ preferences 150 // 10.2.1.1 Taking into account the interests of others when such action directly increases the prosperity of the individual ("pseudo altruism") 151 // 10.2.1.2 The uncalculated needed to do good (hard core // altruism) 151 // 10.2.1.3 Reciprocal altruism 152 // 10.2.1a the urge of individuals to group together in clubs 152 // 10.2.1.5 Mutuality (solidarity) of community members 155 // 10.2.1.6 Respect for authority 156 // 10.2.2 The willingness to redistribute in favour of public goods (the acceptability of taxation) 157 // 10.2.3 Hypotheses regarding the willingness to contribute to redistribution 158 // 10.2a the "demand side" of redistribution: the information problem 160 // 10.2.5 Efficiency of redistribution in relation to the donor’s preferences 162 // 10.3 Altruistic allocation models 167 // 10.3.1 Model of absolute solidarity 168 // 10.3.2 Model of minimization of the risk of simultaneous extinction of both individuals: cruel altruism 170 // 10a the state05in the role of donor 17? // 10.5 Some debatable principles/rules of the donor activities of the state 178 // 10.5.1 Result of non transferability of a subsidy to the next period optimal subsidy timing model 179 // 10.5.2 Prescribed subsidy use structure 185 //

Conclusion 193 // References 199 // Name index 205