.

0 (hodnocen0 x )

BK

First paperback edition

Cambridge (UK) : Cambridge University Press, 2010

xxiv, 232 stran ilustrace, 1 mapa ; 23 cm

ISBN 978-0-521-15571-7 (brožováno)

Obsahuje bibliografii, bibliografické odkazy a rejstřík

001653009

Contents // List of Tables and Figures page xi // Acknowledgments xiii // Introduction xv // 0.1 The Argument xvii // 0.2 The Study of Institutions in Dictatorships xix // 0.3 Plan of the Book xxi // 1 The World of Dictatorial Institutions 1 // 1.1 Introduction 1 // 1.2 What Is Dictatorship? 2 // 1.2.1 Historical Usage 3 // 1.2.2 Contemporary Controversies 7 // 1.3 Who Are the Dictators? 12 // 1.3.1 Monarchs 21 // 1.3.2 Military Dictators 25 // 1.3.3 Civilian Dictators 29 // 1.3.4 Operationalization of Dictatorial Types 31 // 1.4 Nominally Democratic Institutions 34 // 1.4.1 Legislatures 34 // 1.4.2 Political Parties 36 // 1.5 Conclusion 39 // 2 Three Illustrative Cases 42 // 2.1 Introduction 42 // 2.2 Kuwait: Strength without Institutions 44 // 2.2.1 Sabah Consolidation of Power 44 // 2.2.2 Merchants and the Push for Institutions 46 // vii // viii Contents // 2.2.3 The Majlis Movement and the Regime’s // Response 49 // 2.3 Morocco: Survival with Institutions 52 // 2.3.1 The Rise of Monarchical and Nationalist // Forces 52 // 2.3.2 Managing State-Building and Opposition 55 // 2.3.3 The Battle over Institutions 58 // 2.4 Ecuador: The Perils of Noninstitutionalization 61 // 2.4.1 Prelude to Military Rule 61 // 2.4.2 The Military’s Agenda 64 // 2.4.3 The Rise of Opposition 66 // 2.4.4 Underinstitutionalization and Its Consequences 68 // 2.5 Conclusion 71 // 3 Use of Institutions to Co-opt 73 // 3.1 Introduction 73 // 3.2 Dictatorial Concessions 74 // 3.3 Dictatorial

Institutions 77 // 3.4 Actors and Preferences 82 // 3.5 Timing 86 // 3.6 Results: Three Equilibria 87 // 3.6.1 Cooperation Equilibrium 87 // 3.6.2 Co-optation Equilibrium 88 // 3.6.3 Turmoil Equilibrium 90 // 3.7 Predicting Dictatorial Institutions 92 // 3.7.1 Data 92 // 3.8 Conclusion 100 // 3.9 Appendix 101 // 3.9.1 Solutions 101 // 3.9.2 Comparative Statics 105 // 4 Institutions and Policies under Dictatorship 107 // 4.1 Introduction 107 // 4.2 Which Policies? 110 // 4.3 Civil Liberties 116 // 4.3.1 Data 117 // 4.3.2 Effect of Institutions 122 // 4.4 Military Expenditures 126 // 4.4.1 Data 127 // 4.5 Social Spending 132 // 4.5.1 Data 133 // 4.5.2 Effect of Institutions 135 // 4.6 Conclusion 137 // Contents ix // 5 Institutions and Outcomes under Dictatorship 139 // 5.1 Introduction 139 // 5.2 Institutional Mechanisms for Economic Development 142 // 5.3 Alternative Theoretical Frameworks 146 // 5.3.1 Mobilization Power of Single-Party Regimes 147 // 5.3.2 State Autonomy 148 // 5.3.3 Importance of Noninstitutionalized Factors 149 // 5.4 Institutions and Economic Growth 150 // 5.4.1 Model Specification 151 // 5.4.2 Data 152 // 5.4.3 Effect of Institutions: Results from Random // Effects Models 154 // 5.4.4 Effect of Institutions: Results from Heckman // Selection Model 157 // 5.4.5 Conclusion 160 // 6 Institutions and the Survival of Dictators 163 // 6.1 Introduction 163 // 6.2 Managing Political Survival 165 // 6.3 Impact of Institutions on Survival 169 // 6.3.1 Event History

Analysis 169 // 6.3.2 Data 171 // 6.3.3 Impact of Institutions on Survival 175 // 6.4 Conclusion 177 // 7 Conclusion 180 // 8 Codebook of Variables 189 // Bibliography 195 // Author Index 215 // Subject Index 221