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BK

Eseje

Mansfield Centre : Martino Publishing, 2014

xii, 226 stran ; 23 cm

ISBN 978-1-61427-554-1 (brožováno)

Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy a rejstřík

Reprint vydání včetně titulní strany: Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1933

001653284

I. INTRODUCTION // § I. THE PROBLEM // i. Philosophy must raise the question what philosophy is ...1 // 2. Three suggested ways of approaching this question ...2 // 3. The way to be followed here: an account of philosophical method ...3 // 4. Importance of this subject at the present time .. 4 // § 2. THE METHOD // 5. Necessity of restricting the subject under discussion ...7 // 6. Significance of the comparison between philosophical and scientific thought // § 3. HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS // 7. Socrate ...10 // 8. Plato ...11 // 9. Descartes // 10. Kant // II. THE OVERLAP OF CLASSES // § I. THE THEORY OF CLASSIFICATION IN FORMAL LOGIC // 1. The traditional theory of classification ...26 // 2. Its application in exact (mathematical) science .. 29 // 3. Its application in empirical science ...30 // THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF APPLYING IT RIGIDLY TO PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS // 4. Specific classes here overlap one another // 5. This fact long recognized in certain cases // 6. The case of concepts having a philosophical and a nonphilosophical phase ...33 // 7. The overlap of classes in logic ...36 // 8. The overlap of classes in ethics ...41 // 9. Significance of these facts: the reader invited to admit their genuineness for the sake of argument .. 43 // § 3. CONSEQUENCES FOR PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD // 10. Methods proper to science (exact or empirical) inapplicable in philosophy, owing to the overlap of classes // 11. The fallacy of precarious margins // 12. The fallacy of identified coincidents // 13. Their common round : the fallacy of false disjunction // 14. The first rule of philosophical method: ... ’A distinction without a difference’ // 15. Corollaries of this rule, (a) The object of philosophica thought cannot be a classificatory system // 16. (b) Nor yet an aggregate, i.e. a whole of separable parts //

17. These corollaries to be underst against unadvisedly assuming the opposite // III. THE SCALE OF FORMS // § 1. PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE IDEA // 1. The species of a philosophical genus do not differ merely in degree ...54 // 2. Nor merely in kind ...55 // 3. Philosophy is interested in cases where these two are combined ...56 // 4. The scale of forms: its place in the history of philosophy ...57 // 5. Such scales occur both in philosophy and elsewhere ...59 // 6. But in a philosophical scale of forms the variable is identical with the generic essence // § 2. TWO DIFFICULTIES // 7. (i) This identification seems nonsensical ..61 // 8. (ii) The scale, as hitherto described, accounts only for an overlap between opposites, not distincts ..63 // 9. It would follow that philosophical specification is by opposition, non-philosophical by distinction .. 64 // 10. Consequences of this. It disintegrates a philosophical scale of forms, requiring us to jettison all intermediate terms and keep only the extremes ...65 // II. It requires us to jettison all distinctions between one philosophical concept and another ...66 // 12. It disintegrates a non-philosophical scale of forms, and claims its extremes for philosophy ...67 // 13. Finally it leads to a fatal dilemma concerning the relation between opposition and distinction ...68 // § 3. DEGREE AND KIND: OPPOSITION AND DISTINCTION // 14. In philosophy there are differences of degree, but we cannot measure them // 15. This is because they are fused in a peculiar way with differences of kind ...71 // 16. Such a fusion follows from the principle of overlapping classes ...74 // 17. There is a similar fusion of opposition and distinction ...74 // 18. This also follows from the overlap of classes ...76 // Summary: in philosophy there is a fusion (a) of differences with differences in kind, (b) of relations of in degree opposition with relations of distinction ...76 //

§ 4. DEGREE AND KIND IN THE SCALE OF FORMS // 20. The fusion of degree and kind removes the first of the two difficulties (§ 2.7) ...77 // 21. Example of beauty ...77 // 22. Example of goodness ...78 // 23. Example of pleasure ...79 // 24. The fallacy of calculation and the fallacy of equivalence ...80 // § 5. OPPOSITION AND DISTINCTION IN THE SCALE OF FORMS // 25. The scale begins not with zero, but with unity ..81 // 26. i.e. with a minimum realization of the generic essence ...82 // 27. Relatively to higher terms, this is a negation of that essence ...82 // 28. The same relation subsists between any two adjacent terms in the scale ...84 // 29. The fallacy of the false positive and the fallacy of null opposition ...85 // § 6. THE SCALE OF FORMS AND THE OVERLAP OF CLASSES // 30. Each term surpasses the next below, not only generically but specifically ...86 // 31. It therefore sums up the whole scale to that point ...89 // 32. Thus it both negates and reaffirms the next below, and this explains the overlap of classes ...90 // 33. And makes the conception of overlap more precise ...91 // IV. DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION // 1. The view that philosophical concepts are definable. Its difficulties ...92 // 2. The view that they are not. Its dangers .. 92 // 3. In exact science, definition implies (a) separation of essence (expounded in definitions) from properties (expounded in theorems) // 4. In philosophy this is impossible; here therefore the definition of a concept is coextensive with its entire exposition // 5. (b) An absolute difference between knowing the essence of a concept and not knowing it // 6. This too is impossible in philosophy, where coming to know means coming to know better ...96 // 7. The traditional rules of definition must therefore be modified in the case of philosophical definition ...98 //

8. Description of an empirical concept. Its likeness and unlikeness to philosophical definition ...98 // 9. The principles of philosophical definition. Illustrations from Plato and Aristotle ...100 // 10. Illustration from Kant ...102 // V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUDGEMENT: QUALITY AND QUANTITY // 1. Division of the subject ...104 // § I. AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL // 2. In philosophy we cannot deny without making a corresponding affirmation // 3. Proof of the principle of concrete negation // 4. Fallacy of abstract negation // 5. Fallacy of abstract affirmation // 6. Proof of the principle of concrete affirnation // 7. Applications of the principle // 8. The two principles combined // § 2. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUDGEMENT // 9. There are three elements in all universal judgements ...111 // 10. There are three types of thought according as one or other takes precedence of the rest // 11. In philosophy each type by itself is fallacious // 12. In a philosophical judgement all three forms of structure coexist ...115 // VI. PHILOSOPHY AS CATEGORICAL THINKING // § 1. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE // 1. The judgements composing the body of mathematics are hypothetical // 2. So are those of empirical science // 3. But in philosophy the body of knowledge consists of judgements about a subject-matter conceived as real (i.e. categorical judgements) // § 2. THE EVIDENCE OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY // 4. Quotations from philosophers expressing their recognition of the principle // 5. The Ontological Proof, its origin and history // 6. Its significance. The object of philosophical thought cannot be conceived except as existing // 7. The principle further supported by examination (a) of logic // 8. (b) Of moral philosophy // § 3. FINAL STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLE //

9. Conclusion from the evidence cited: the body of philosophical thought is essentially categorical, though it contains hypothetical elements // 10. Proof of this from the principle of overlapping classes // 11. Exclusion of further problems // VII. TWO SCEPTICAL POSITIONS // 1. Scepticism as to whether a philosophical proposition can be established by constructive reasoning // § I. CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY // 2. Philosophy as the critical destruction of false views without asserting or implying true ones // 3. This induces a superficial, because merely formal, valuation of the views criticized // 4. It implies constructive doctrines on which its work is based, but neglects to formulate them // §2. ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY // 5. Philosophy as the analysis of propositions drawn from non-philosophical sources // 6. Analysis of this philosophy into three parts, only one of which is indubitably philosophical // 7. This, however, it neglects to work out // 8. But is not entitled to take it for granted // 9. Both these philosophies share the fault that they assume constructive doctrines while professing not to do so // 10. Both are inconsistent with the first principles of philosophical method as laid down in this essay // VIII . DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION // § I. THE IDEA OF DEDUCTIVE DEMONSTRATION // I. Demonstration in exact science // 2. It implies (a) logical principles external to the science, (b) principles belonging to the science itself // 3. It never checks or criticizes, and cannot confirm, these principles, i.e. it is irreversible in direction // § 2. PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT CONFORM TO THAT IDEA // 4. The distinction between two kinds of principles disappears // 5. Is its direction irreversible ? // 6. In spite of his theory, Descartes in practice realized that it is not // 7. So did Spinoza and Leibniz //

8. Therefore Hegel’s demand that philosophy should justify its starting-point is not new // § 3. PHILOSOPHY AND ITS STARTING-POINT // 9. Does this imply a vicious circle? // 10. No, because its aim is not to create knowledge e mhilo // 11. The demonstrandum is something which we in some sense already know // 12. Our demonstration is verified by appeal to this previous knowledge, and this serves to check the starting-point of the argument // § 4. PHILOSOPHY AND INDUCTION // 13. Induction in empirical science // Its two kinds of principles, and irreversibility // 15. In philosophy our initial knowledge differs in three ways from the data of inductive thought // 16. The process to which the data are subjected is different in the two cases // 17. The result of the process is different // § 5. PHILOSOPHY AND EXPERIENCE // 18. The continuity of philosophy with the experience in which it begins // 19. This implies their homogeneity // 20. They are related as terms in a scale of forms // 21. Philosophical theory and philosophical experience // 22. Summary and conclusion // IX. THE IDEA OF SYSTEM // § I. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES // I. Reasons for the common prejudice against system // 2. This prejudice as the expression of a legitimate demand // 3. (a) No system can be final // (b) No single philosopher can do all the work required to construct a system // 5. (c) Any system is merely personal // 6. (d) Any system does violence to the diversity of philosophical problems // § 2. EXPOSITION OF THE IDEA // 7. The idea of system is indispensable to philosophy ...185 // 8. The divisions of its subject-matter form overlapping classes ...188 // 9. And fall into a scale of forms. Systematic philosophy as a scale of philosophies ...189 // 10. This conception clears up the difficulties stated in § 1 ...190 // § 3. EXAMPLES OF ITS PARTIAL REALIZATION //

11. The idea constantly tends to realize itself: e.g // 12. (a) In the relation between the philosophical sciences // 13. (b) In the history of philosophy // 14. (c) In the philosophy of a single age // 15. (d) In the philosophy of a single man // X. PHILOSOPHY AS A BRANCH OF LITERATURE // § I. PROSE AND POETRY // 1. The two elements in prose // 2. The relation between them // 3. In poetry there is only one // 4. Prose is poetry with a difference // 5. Prose and verse // § 2. PHILOSOPHICAL PROSE AND SCIENTIFIC PROSE // 6. Technical terms are sought in science and avoided in philosophy // 7. What they are. Symbolism and language // 8. Why they are needed in science and not in philosophy // 9. The needs of philosophy can only be met by ordinary (literary or non-technical) language // § 3. PHILOSOPHICAL STYLE AND HISTORICAL STYLE // 10. Historical style is didactic ...208 // 11. Philosophical style is the opposite ...209 // 12. We "consult" historians, but "follow" philosophers ...211 // § 4. PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY // 13. They are alike in the intimate relation between writer and reader ...212 // Philosophy as the point at which prose comes nearest to being poetry // The philosopher uses language as the poets use it, but what he writes must be prose // § 5. THE READER’S RELATION TO THE WRITER // (a) As understanding him. The reader must (i) read philosophy as pure literature // (ii) Come to it prepared for the special philosophical problem of that special work // (6) As criticizing him. This is necessary to comprehension, but logically posterior to it // It has a positive and a negative side // M // 20. The critic as pupil // XI. CONCLUSION // 1. Does the view hitherto stated agree with experience ? // 2. This question has been already asked piecemeal as the argument proceeded. Justification of this method //

3. Whose experience? That of all philosophers, ourselves included // 4. Does this not rest on an unproved assumption ? // 5. If it is an assumption, it is one of those assumptions which are not only legitimate but obligatory // INDEX