.

0 (hodnocen0 x )

EB

ONLINE

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012

1 online resource (xiii, 207 p.) : ill

ISBN 9781139782920 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9781107027244 (hardback)

ISBN 9781107658196 (paperback)

Includes bibliographical references and index

Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today’s world.

"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security order. Experts have long understood that leaders looking to secure allies face a critical tradeoff between strengthening their prospective ally to deter challenges to it while simultaneously refraining from making the ally too aggressive. The author explains how and when leaders can balance these tensions by building commitments that contain conditions and ambiguity"-- Provided by publisher..

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries

001749476

full

(Au-PeEL)EBL1042524

(CaONFJC)MIL402852

(CaPaEBR)ebr10618614

(MiAaPQ)EBC1042524

(OCoLC)833769634