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The Hague : T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020

1 online resource (538 pages)

ISBN 9789462654198 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9789462654181

Nl Arms Ser.

Print version: Osinga, Frans NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020 The Hague : T.M.C. Asser Press,c2020 ISBN 9789462654181

13.4.4 Phase 4: Post-ISIS Balancing -- 13.5 Conclusion -- References -- Deterrence of Non-State Actors -- 14 Deterring Violent Non-state Actors -- Abstract -- 14.1 Introduction: The Nature of the Problem -- 14.2 VNSAs in the International System: From Nuisance Level to Global Threat -- 14.3 Why Deterring VNSAs is Challenging -- 14.4 Deterrence Theory and the Impact of VNSAs -- 14.5 Why States Choose to Deter VNSAs -- 14.6 How to Deter VNSAs: Strategic Approaches and Tactical Methods -- 14.7 Tailored Deterrence: Israel’s Deterrence Relations with Hamas and Hizballah -- 14.7.1 Israel’s Experience -- 14.8 Case Study Analysis -- 14.9 Conclusions -- References -- 15 All Deterrence Is Local: The Utility and Application of Localised Deterrence in Counterinsurgency -- Abstract -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Explaining the Local Turn -- 15.3 Localised Deterrence -- 15.4 What to Deter? -- 15.5 Whom to Deter? -- 15.6 Driving Factors for (Un)desired Behaviour -- 15.7 How to Deter? -- 15.8 Conclusion -- References -- 16 "This Has Triggered a Civil War": Russian Deterrence of Democratic Revolts -- Abstract -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Strategic Impact of Democratic Revolts -- 16.3 Deterrence and Domestic Repression -- 16.4 The Elusive Adversary -- 16.5 Punishment and Threat -- 16.6 Keeping the Threat Alive -- 16.7 Conclusion -- References -- 17 Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms -- Abstract -- 17.1 Introduction -- 17.2 Rational Deterrence in Peace Operations-The Predominant View -- 17.3 Increasing the Number of Actors to Deter -- 17.4 Increasing the Number of Influence Mechanisms -- 17.5 Reinterpreting UNAMSIL -- 17.6 Conclusion -- References -- New Instruments and Domains of Deterrence -- 18 Targeted Sanctions and Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century -- Abstract.

23.4.5 Affect.

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Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- 1 Introduction-The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Cold War Focus: General Nuclear Deterrence -- 1.3 Moving on: Including Conventional Deterrence -- 1.4 Beyond the Cold War and General Deterrence -- 1.5 The Enduring Relevance of Deterrence Strategy and Research -- References -- Concepts of Deterrence (Evolution, Rediscovery, Conventional, Nuclear, Cross-Domain) -- 2 Understanding Deterrence -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Definitions and Types -- 2.2.1 Denial Versus Punishment -- 2.2.2 Direct Versus Extended -- 2.2.3 General Versus Immediate -- 2.2.4 Narrow Versus Broad Concepts of Deterrence -- 2.3 The Local Balance of Forces: Important but Not Always Decisive -- 2.4 The Dominant Variable: Perceptions -- 2.5 Three Fundamental Conditions for Successful Deterrence -- 2.5.1 Level of Aggressor Motivation -- 2.5.2 Clarity About the Object of Deterrence and Actions the Defender Will Take -- 2.5.3 Aggressor Must Be Confident That Deterring State Has Capability and Will to Carry Out Threats -- 2.6 Deterrence as a Complex and Nuanced Enterprise -- References -- 3 Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Know Thyself, NATO -- 3.3 Know Thy Enemy -- 3.4 Grand Behaviour -- 3.5 Grand Plans? -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- 4 The Continuing Relevance of Conventional Deterrence -- Abstract -- 4.1 The Nature of Deterrence -- 4.2 Unpacking Conventional Deterrence -- 4.3 Conventional Deterrence in the 20th Century -- 4.4 Conventional Deterrence in the 21st Century -- 4.4.1 Making the Case for Deterrence -- 4.4.2 Has Conventional Deterrence Become Irrelevant? -- 4.4.3 Conventional Military Threats in the 2020s -- 4.4.4 The Merits and Limits of Conventional Deterrence. --

4.5 Principles for Conventional Deterrence -- References -- 5 Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability? -- Abstract -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Genesis of Nuclear Deterrence -- 5.3 The Birth of the Concept of Strategic Stability -- 5.4 Modern Nuclear Doctrines -- 5.5 The Dichotomy of Nuclear Deterrence -- 5.6 The Collapse of Nuclear Arms Control -- 5.7 Renewing Strategic Stability and Arms Control -- References -- 6 The US and Extended Deterrence -- Abstract -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Current U.S. Nuclear Posture and Challenges -- 6.3 Perceived Need for Flexibility -- 6.4 Superiority and Triad Renewal -- 6.5 Lowering the Threshold -- 6.6 Difficult Decades Ahead -- References -- 7 Deterrence by Punishment or Denial? The eFP Case -- Abstract -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Academic Divide: eFP, Deterrence by Punishment or by Denial? -- 7.3 Strategic Culture -- 7.4 Method and Data -- 7.5 Deterrence and Strategic Cultures of the Baltic eFP Hosting Countries -- 7.5.1 Estonia -- 7.5.2 Latvia -- 7.5.3 Lithuania -- 7.6 Conclusion -- References -- 8 The Essence of Cross-Domain Deterrence -- Abstract -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Origins of Cross-Domain Deterrence -- 8.3 The CDD Literature: Practical Innovation Versus Theoretical Reconceptualisation -- 8.3.1 Innovation in Practical Application -- 8.3.2 Attribution -- 8.3.3 Threat Credibility and Proportionality -- 8.3.4 Signalling -- 8.3.5 Escalation Management -- 8.4 Refinement and Reinterpretation-Expansion and Reconceptualisation -- 8.4.1 Refinement of Traditional Concepts of Deterrence -- 8.4.2 Reinterpretation of Deterrence by Denial -- 8.4.3 Expansion of Deterrence by Punishment: Norms, Delegitimisation and Entanglement -- 8.4.4 From Deterrence to Dissuasion -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References -- Non-Western Concepts of Deterrence.

9 Deterrence a la Ruse: Its Uniqueness, Sources and Implications -- Abstract -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Etymological Uniqueness and Logical Idiosyncrasy -- 9.3 The Russian Approach to Deterrence: Sources and Evolution of Theory -- 9.3.1 Imprint of Intellectual History -- 9.3.2 Imprint of Strategic Practice -- 9.3.3 Imprint of Strategic Culture -- 9.4 Russian Approach to Deterrence: The Implications -- References -- 10 An Overview of Chinese Thinking About Deterrence -- Abstract -- 10.1 Differing Definitions of Deterrence -- 10.2 China’s Concepts of Nuclear Deterrence -- 10.3 Chinese Concepts of Space Deterrence -- 10.4 Chinese Concepts of Information Deterrence -- 10.5 A Possible Information Deterrence Ladder -- 10.6 Other Chinese Deterrence Activities -- 10.6.1 Mobilisation -- 10.6.2 Conventional Deterrence -- 10.6.3 Non-military Deterrence Activities -- 10.7 Deterrence by Punishment or Denial (?) -- 10.8 Conclusion -- References -- 11 Japanese Concepts of Deterrence -- Abstract -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Deterrence-by-Denial and Japan’s Threat Perception -- 11.3 Determinants of Japan’s Deterrence Posture -- 11.3.1 Legal Constraints -- 11.3.2 Normative Constraints -- 11.4 Japan’s Deterrence-by-Denial Posture -- 11.5 Conclusion -- References -- 12 Deterrence (In)stability Between India and Pakistan -- Abstract -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 On Deterrence Stability -- 12.3 Events Since 2015 -- 12.4 Assessment -- 12.5 Context and Narrative -- 12.6 Conclusion -- References -- 13 Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence -- Abstract -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Logic of the Relationship -- 13.3 Iranians Debate Syria -- 13.4 The Evolution of Iranian Strategy after the Arab Spring -- 13.4.1 Phase 1: Iran’s Basij Strategy -- 13.4.2 Phase 2: Iran’s Regionalization Strategy -- 13.4.3 Phase 3: Iran’s Internationalization Strategy.

18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 The Nexus Between Sanctions and Deterrence -- 18.3 The Evolution of Sanctions -- 18.4 What Are Targeted Sanctions? -- 18.5 Deterrence and Targeted Sanctions: Changes and Continuity -- 18.6 Conclusions -- References -- 19 Deterrence, Resilience, and the Shooting Down of Flight MH17 -- Abstract -- 19.1 Introduction -- 19.2 Hybrid Threats -- 19.3 Deterrence and Resilience -- 19.4 Monitoring Resilience -- 19.5 The Case -- 19.6 Trust -- 19.7 Social Capital -- 19.8 Credible Narrative -- 19.9 Conclusion -- References -- 20 Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, and Future -- Abstract -- 20.1 Introduction -- 20.2 The Past -- 20.3 The Present -- 20.4 The Future -- 20.5 Conclusion -- References -- 21 New Technologies and Deterrence: Artificial Intelligence and Adversarial Behaviour -- Abstract -- 21.1 Introduction -- 21.2 The Promises and Pitfalls of Hyper-Coercion -- 21.3 Commercial Dual-Use AI as Coercive Offset -- 21.4 Autonomous Weapons and the Advent of Saturation Tactics -- 21.5 Leveraging Moral Asymmetries for Coercive Gain -- 21.6 Enhancing the Credibility of Military Action -- 21.7 Conclusions: Next Steps for AI and Deterrence -- References -- Rationality, Psychology, and Emotions -- 22 Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age: Game Theory Revisited -- Abstract -- 22.1 Introduction -- 22.2 Game Theory Basics -- 22.3 Nuclear Deterrence and Basic Game Theory -- 22.4 Moving beyond the Limitations of Basic Game Theory Models -- 22.5 Nuclear Deterrence-Games and Decisions -- References -- 23 What’s on the Human Mind? Decision Theory and Deterrence -- Abstract -- 23.1 Introduction -- 23.2 Rationality and the Evolution of Deterrence Theory -- 23.3 Rationality and the Eye of the Beholder -- 23.4 Our Thinking Patterns: Heuristics and Biases -- 23.4.1 Anchoring -- 23.4.2 Confirmation -- 23.4.3 Availability -- 23.4.4 Representativeness.

(Au-PeEL)EBL6420690

(MiAaPQ)EBC6420690

(OCoLC)1228877617