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Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2018

1 online resource (273 pages)

ISBN 9783319635910 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9783319635903

Governance and Limited Statehood Ser.

Print version: Hackenesch, Christine The EU and China in African Authoritarian Regimes Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2018 ISBN 9783319635903

Opening or Closing Political Spaces -- 2.4 African Economic Dependence on the EU.

2.1 The EU’s Strategies to Promote Governance Reforms -- The EU’s Approach: Content and Channels -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative or Confrontational Strategy? -- 2.2 African Governments’ Responsiveness -- Interaction Effects: EU Good Governance Strategies and African Governments’ Responsiveness -- 2.3 Survival Strategies of Governments in Dominant party Regimes -- Survival Strategies -- The Foundation of Political Survival: Strengthening the Party or the State -- Managing Political Survival: Effectively Controlling Arenas of Contestation Such as Elections, Parliaments and Courts -- Managing Political Survival: Opening and Closing Political Spaces -- Structural and Situational Factors That Impact on the Choice of Survival Strategies -- EU Good Governance Strategies Meet Dominant Party Regimes -- Building Effective States -- Managing Arenas of Political Contestation ---

Opening or Closing Political Spaces -- 2.4 African Economic Dependence on the EU.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Acronyms -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 EU Good Governance Strategies Face Two Challenges: The Predominance of African Dominant Party Systems and China’s Rise in Africa -- EU Good Governance Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa -- The ’New Authoritarianism’ in Africa: Dominant Party Systems -- China’s Rise in Africa -- 1.2 Different Parts of the Same Elephant? Researching EU Good Governance Strategies and China’s Engagement in Africa -- Why Should We Focus on African Governments’ Strategies? -- 1.3 Why Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda? -- Three Dominant Party Regimes -- In a Nutshell: Angola’s, Ethiopia’s and Rwanda’s Responsiveness -- 1.4 Structure of the Book -- Chapter 2: The Initial Puzzle: Why Governments in Dominant Party Systems Engage with the EU on Good Governance Reform, or Not ---

2000-2005: Why Was Rwanda Reluctant to Engage with the EU in Governance Reforms? -- 2006-2011: Why Did Rwanda Increasingly (Pro)actively Engage? -- The 2012 Crisis and Its Aftermath: Why Has Rwanda Continued to Engage? -- What If…? -- Outlook -- Chapter 4: Ethiopia -- 4.1 Structural Factors Shaping Ethiopia’s Survival Strategies -- 4.2 Ethiopia Reluctantly Engaging with the EU in the Early 2000s -- The EU’ Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005 -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical -- The Ethiopian Government’s Responsiveness: Reluctant Engagement Between 2000 and 2005 -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid -- The Ethiopian Government’s Survival Strategies ---

Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Political Dialogue -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Aid Policy Dialogues -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid -- The Ethiopian Government’s Survival Strategies -- Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the State to the Party -- Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using Low-Intensity Coercion -- Ethiopia’s Economic Dependence on the EU -- China: Alternative Cooperation Partner Since 2006 -- China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner -- Attractiveness of the China ’Model’ and Support for Survival Strategies -- Party-to-Party Relations -- 4.5 Brief Breeze of Change in EU-Ethiopia Cooperation Between 2011 and 2014 -- 4.6 Conclusions -- Why Has Ethiopia Only Reluctantly Engaged in Governance Reforms Between 2000 and 2005? ---

Strong Threats to Regime Survival: A Split in the Ruling Elite -- Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the Party to the State.

China: Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner.

Survival Strategies I: Strengthening the Effectiveness of Government Institutions to Improve Public Goods Provision -- Survival Strategies II: Using Arenas of Contestation and Low-intensity Coercion to Prevent Challenges from the Opposition -- Rwanda’s Economic Dependence on the EU -- China: Becoming More Important, But No Alternative Cooperation Partner (Yet) -- China: More Important, But No Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner -- Chinese ’Model’ Attractive, But Little Chinese Support for Rwanda’s Survival Strategies -- 3.4 A U-turn in the EU’s Strategies in 2012 But Little Change in Rwanda’s Responsiveness -- Rwanda’s Survival Strategies and Economic Dependence on the EU -- Signs of a Gradual Change in China’s Policy Towards Rwanda? -- Outlook: What Prospects for Strengthening Economic Cooperation with China? -- 3.5 Conclusions ---

Why Has Ethiopia Again Become More Forthcoming to Engage Between 2011 and 2014? -- What If…? -- Outlook -- Chapter 5: Angola -- 5.1 Structural Factors Shaping Angola’s Survival Strategies -- 5.2 Angola Reluctantly Engaging in Governance Reforms in the Early 2000s Despite China Emerging -- The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005 -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical -- 2000-2005: Angola Started to Very Reluctantly Engage -- Angola’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Angola’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality -- The Angolan Government’s Survival Strategies -- Little Domestic Opposition and Challenge to Regime Survival -- Using State Institutions and the Party for Cooptation -- Managing Arenas of Contestation: Elections -- Angola’s Economic Dependence on the EU ---

2000-2005: Why Was Rwanda Reluctant to Engage with the EU in Governance Reforms? -- 2006-2011: Why Did Rwanda Increasingly (Pro)actively Engage? -- The 2012 Crisis and Its Aftermath: Why Has Rwanda Continued to Engage? -- What If…? -- Outlook -- Chapter 4: Ethiopia -- 4.1 Structural Factors Shaping Ethiopia’s Survival Strategies -- 4.2 Ethiopia Reluctantly Engaging with the EU in the Early 2000s -- The EU’ Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005 -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical -- The Ethiopian Government’s Responsiveness: Reluctant Engagement Between 2000 and 2005 -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid -- The Ethiopian Government’s Survival Strategies ---

China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner -- 5.3 The Late 2000s: Angola Largely Indifferent Towards EU Demands to Engage on Governance Reforms Even Though the EU Narrows Its Strategies -- EU Good Governance Strategies and Angola’s Responsiveness -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Effective Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative Strategy -- Angola Remained Largely Indifferent to Demands for Cooperation from 2006 to 2014 -- Angola’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Angola’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality -- The Angolan Government’s Survival Strategies -- Mounting Opposition from Outside and Within the Ruling Elite -- Boosting the Ruling Party as a Vehicle for Cooptation -- Using Formal and Informal State Institutions for Cooptation Rather than Provision of Public Services ---

Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Political Dialogue -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Aid Policy Dialogues -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid -- The Ethiopian Government’s Survival Strategies -- Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the State to the Party -- Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using Low-Intensity Coercion -- Ethiopia’s Economic Dependence on the EU -- China: Alternative Cooperation Partner Since 2006 -- China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner -- Attractiveness of the China ’Model’ and Support for Survival Strategies -- Party-to-Party Relations -- 4.5 Brief Breeze of Change in EU-Ethiopia Cooperation Between 2011 and 2014 -- 4.6 Conclusions -- Why Has Ethiopia Only Reluctantly Engaged in Governance Reforms Between 2000 and 2005? ---

Low-intensity Coercion and Managing Arenas of Contestation -- Angola’s Economic Dependence on the EU.

Strong Threats to Regime Survival: A Split in the Ruling Elite -- Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the Party to the State.

The 2005 Elections: Cooperating with the EU on Governance Reforms Threatens Regime Survival -- Why Ethiopia Continued to Reluctantly Engage Between 2006 and the 2010 Elections.

Dependence on Aid and Other Official Flows -- Dependence on Trade and Investments -- 2.5 The Rise of China: What Effect? -- Cooperating with China: Reducing Economic Dependence on the EU? -- China: Alternative Support for Survival Strategies? -- 2.6 Map of the Puzzle: Explaining African Governments’ Responsiveness -- Chapter 3: Rwanda -- 3.1 Structural Factors Shaping Rwanda’s Survival Strategies -- 3.2 Rwanda Reluctantly Engaged with the EU in the Early 2000s -- The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005 -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical -- The Rwandan Government’s Responsiveness: Reluctant Engagement -- Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Political Dialogue and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid -- The Rwandan Government’s Survival Strategies -- Strong Domestic Opposition and Threats to Regime Survival -- Survival Strategies: Building the Foundation for State Reform, Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using Low-intensity Coercion -- Rwanda: Strongly Aid Dependent on the EU in the Early 2000s -- China: No Alternative Cooperation Partner in the Early 2000s -- 3.3 Rwanda Proactively Engaging with the EU in the Late 2000s Despite China Looming -- The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2006 and 2011 -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Rewarding -- The Rwandan Government’s Responsiveness: (Pro)Active Engagement -- Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality -- Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid -- The Rwandan Government’s Survival Strategies -- A Period of Regime Stability with Few Threats to Regime Survival.

Survival Strategies I: Strengthening the Effectiveness of Government Institutions to Improve Public Goods Provision -- Survival Strategies II: Using Arenas of Contestation and Low-intensity Coercion to Prevent Challenges from the Opposition -- Rwanda’s Economic Dependence on the EU -- China: Becoming More Important, But No Alternative Cooperation Partner (Yet) -- China: More Important, But No Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner -- Chinese ’Model’ Attractive, But Little Chinese Support for Rwanda’s Survival Strategies -- 3.4 A U-turn in the EU’s Strategies in 2012 But Little Change in Rwanda’s Responsiveness -- Rwanda’s Survival Strategies and Economic Dependence on the EU -- Signs of a Gradual Change in China’s Policy Towards Rwanda? -- Outlook: What Prospects for Strengthening Economic Cooperation with China? -- 3.5 Conclusions ---

Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Low-­Intensity Coercion -- Ethiopia’s Economic Dependence on the EU Between 2000 and 2005 -- China: Limited Engagement Between 2000 and 2005 -- 4.3 The 2005 Election Crisis: A Turning Point in EU-Ethiopia relations -- The EU’s Good Governance Strategy -- The Ethiopian Government’s Response: Indifference -- The Costs and Benefits for Ethiopia of Ceasing to Engage with the EU -- China’s Support During the 2005 Election Crisis: Reducing Donor Pressure -- 4.4 Ethiopia Reluctantly Engaging with the EU in the Late 2000s Despite China’s Strong Presence -- EU Good Governance Strategies and Ethiopia’s Responsiveness -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Governance -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical -- Ethiopia’s Responsiveness Between 2006 and 2010: Reluctant Engagement ---

Why Has Ethiopia Again Become More Forthcoming to Engage Between 2011 and 2014? -- What If…? -- Outlook -- Chapter 5: Angola -- 5.1 Structural Factors Shaping Angola’s Survival Strategies -- 5.2 Angola Reluctantly Engaging in Governance Reforms in the Early 2000s Despite China Emerging -- The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005 -- The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government -- The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical -- 2000-2005: Angola Started to Very Reluctantly Engage -- Angola’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues -- Angola’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality -- The Angolan Government’s Survival Strategies -- Little Domestic Opposition and Challenge to Regime Survival -- Using State Institutions and the Party for Cooptation -- Managing Arenas of Contestation: Elections -- Angola’s Economic Dependence on the EU ---

001894978

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(Au-PeEL)EBL6422529

(MiAaPQ)EBC6422529

(OCoLC)1231609385