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Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2021

1 online resource (478 pages)

ISBN 9783662623176 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9783662623169

Beitrage Zum Auslandischen offentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht Ser. ; v.298

Print version: von Bogdandy, Armin Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,c2021 ISBN 9783662623169

Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I: Understanding the Development in EU Member States -- Not on Bread Alone Doth Man Liveth (Deut. 8:3 -- Mat 4:4): Some Iconoclastic Views on Populism, Democracy, the Rule of Law and t... -- 1 Populism -- 2 What of the Disillusionment with Liberal Democracy? -- 3 Poland -- Reference -- Constitutional Crisis in Poland 2015-2016 in the Light of the Rule of Law Principle -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts and Law -- 3 Controversies Concerning Three Constitutional Judges -- 4 The Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality -- 5 Constitutional Tribunals Scope of Competence -- 6 Legal Effects of the K 34/15 Judgment -- 7 May the Constitutional Tribunal Bypass an Act of Parliament? -- 8 Presumption of Legality of Acts Issued by State Bodies -- 9 Closing Remarks. The Crisis of Procedures -- References -- Hungarys Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for `Informed EU Sanctions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Big Picture: Targeted Legislation and Constitutional Malfunctions -- 2.1 Lex Friends and Lex Enemies -- 2.1.1 Turning the Data Protection Ombudsman into an Authority Influenced by the Government -- 2.1.2 Sending Judges into Retirement -- 2.1.3 Labelling Foreign Funded NGOs -- 2.1.4 Targeting the `Soros University -- 2.1.5 `Stopping Soros (and Migration) -- 2.1.6 The System of Lex Friends and Lex Enemies: The Fundamental Challenge to the Rule of Law in Hungary -- 2.2 Unrestrained Constitutional Amendments -- 2.3 The Constitutional Court: Still a Counterbalance or, Already an Ally of the Government? -- 2.3.1 Filling the Court with Fidesz-Loyalist Judges -- 2.3.2 Limiting Constitutional Review in Important Cases -- 2.3.3 New Strategies of the Constitutional Court: Shifting Away from the Control of the Legislative.

3 Why Infringement Procedures Are Ineffective in the Case of Hungary -- 3.1 CJEU Judgments Being Fully or Partly Ignored -- 3.2 Infringement Cases Regarding the NGO Law and the Lex CEU -- 4 Making a Try with Article 7: The Sargentini Report on Hungary -- 4.1 Getting Lost in Details, Missing the Bigger Picture -- 4.2 Limited Political Relevance -- 5 How to Take `Informed Measures in Defence of the Unions Values? -- 5.1 Measuring, Buying or Monitoring the Rule of Law? -- 5.2 How to Indicate Overlapping Systemic Rule of Law Deficiencies? -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: European Action -- Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- 1 What Is at Stake -- 2 The Principles in Abstract -- 2.1 Options -- 2.2 Grounds Against Defending the Unions Values -- 2.3 Grounds in Favour of Defending the Unions Values -- 3 The Principles Applied -- 3.1 The Toolbox -- 3.2 Questions of Competence -- 3.2.1 Article 7 TEU in the Order of Competences -- 3.2.2 Instruments of Secondary Law -- 3.2.3 The Justiciability of the Values -- 3.3 Procedure -- 3.4 Material Standards -- 3.4.1 Red Lines -- 3.4.2 The Comprehensive and Collective Assessment -- 3.4.3 On the Concreteness of the Risk -- 3.5 Control -- 4 Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- References -- The Rule of Law As a Value in the Sense of Article 2 TEU: What Does It Mean and Imply? -- 1 Dangers for the Rule of Law in the Union -- 2 Origins As a Principle of Union Constitutional Law -- 3 No Homogeneity as Regards the Rule of Law in the Union -- 4 Normative Character of the Union Rule of Law -- 4.1 Rule of Law As Value and Principle -- 4.2 Binding Legal Norm -- 4.3 Operational Legal Norm -- 5 The Rule of Law As a Legal Concept -- 5.1 Determining the Content of the Rule of Law -- 5.2 The European Tradition of the Rule of Law -- 5.3 Formal and Material Aspects of the Rule of Law -- 6 The Rule of Law in the Unions Practice.

5.4 Decision Lifting the Measures.

Defending Union Values in Judicial Proceedings. On How to Turn Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Uncertainties Surrounding the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU -- 2.1 Nature: Do Article 2 TEU Values Have Any Legal Effect? -- 2.2 Direct Effect: Are Article 2 TEU Values Directly Applicable? -- 2.3 Jurisdiction: Does the Court Have Competence to Review the Member States Value Compliance? -- 3 Turning Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 3.1 The Groundbreaking Judgment in ASJP -- 3.2 First Rationale: Securing the Functioning of the EUs Judicial System -- 3.3 Second Rationale: Operationalizing the Values in Article 2 TEU -- 4 Anticipating Objections and Advancing Rejoinders -- 4.1 Framing Possible Objections -- 4.2 Methodologically Unsound? -- 4.3 Pretext for a Power Grab? -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Suspension of EU Funds Paid to Member States Breaching the Rule of Law: Is the Commissions Proposal Legal? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conditionality Mechanism in EU Law -- 2.1 The Conditionality Mechanism in EU Internal and External Relations -- 2.2 The Financial Conditionality Mechanisms in EU Secondary Law on EU Funds -- 3 The Conditionality Mechanism Applied for Breaches of the Rule of Law -- 3.1 The Notion of `the Rule of Law -- 3.2 The Notion `Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law in a Member State -- 3.2.1 The Principle of Sound Financial Management (Article 317 TFEU) -- 3.2.2 Protection of the Financial Interests of the Union (Article 325 TFEU) -- 3.2.3 Types of Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law -- 4 Measures Applied Under the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5 The Procedure for Adoption of a Decision Applying the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5.1 Initiation of the Procedure -- 5.2 Who Adopts the Decision? -- 5.3 Voting in the Council by Reverse QMV.

3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution -- 3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Suspending Horizontal Solange: A Decentralized Instrument for Protecting Mutual Trust and the European Rule of Law -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Mutual Trust: The Path Towards Becoming a Founding Constitutional Principle of the EU -- 2.1 Mutual Trust: Initial Steps -- 2.2 Mutual Trust: A Horizontal Principle of Cooperation Among the Member States Judiciaries -- 2.3 Mutual Trust: A Constitutional Principle -- 3 The Rule of Law and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU -- 4 Mutual Trust and Its Exceptions -- 4.1 Political Versus Judicial Determination -- 4.2 Judicial Determination of Systemic Deficiencies -- 4.2.1 Substantive Matters -- 4.2.2 Institutional Aspects -- 4.3 Individual Examination -- 4.4 A Horizontal Solange Doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Books and Journals -- Ascertaining the `Guarantee of Guarantees: Recent Developments Regarding the Infringement Procedure in the EUs Rule of Law C... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Rule of Law Crisis in Court: The Commission Infringement Cases Against Poland -- 2.1 The `Independence of the Supreme Court Case: C-619/18 -- 2.1.1 Combined Interim Relief and Expedited Procedure -- 2.1.1.1 Procedural Novelties -- 2.1.1.2 The Application for Interim Relief and the Courts Two Subsequent Orders -- 2.1.1.3 The Application to Expedite the Procedure -- 2.1.2 Opinion -- 2.1.3 Judgment -- 2.2 The `Case on the Independence of the Ordinary Courts: C-192/18 -- 2.2.1 Opinion -- 2.2.2 Judgment -- 3 Context of the Judgments: The Commission Communications of April and July 2019 -- 4 Conclusions -- References (Primary Sources, Links and Jurisprudence Omitted).

6.1 Rule of Law As Described in the Commission Framework -- 6.2 Rule of Law in the Case Law of the CJEU -- 7 Essence of the Union Rule of Law -- References -- Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About `Dead Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Brief Context of Coping with Rule of Law Backsliding -- 3 Background of Art. 7 TEU -- 4 The Scope of Application of Art. 7 TEU -- 4.1 Clear Risk of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 1) -- 4.2 Stating the Existence of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 2) -- 4.3 Suspension of Rights and Revocation of Sanctions (Procedure No. 3) -- 4.4 Procedural Requirements Specific to Article 7 TEU -- 5 (Utopian) Scenarios for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- 5.1 Thinking Short-Term: Scenario No. 1: Cutting the Funds -- 5.2 Thinking Mid-Term: Scenario No. 2: Overwhelming Ad Hoc Political Pressure -- 5.3 Thinking Long-Term: Scenario No. 3: A Multi-Speed Union -- 6 A Realistic Scenario for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- References -- The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Narrowing the Charters Applicability: Article 51 (1) CFR -- 2.1 Siragusa, Hernndez: Context and Consequences -- 2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51 (1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary -- 2.2.1 The Media Law -- 2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices -- 2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner -- 2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad Interpretation of Article 51 (1) -- 2.4 Revival of ERT? -- 3 Unused Means to Control the Constitution Making Power -- 3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir Constitue -- 3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions.

001895347

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(Au-PeEL)EBL6451167

(MiAaPQ)EBC6451167

(OCoLC)1231606103