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EB

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Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2021

1 online resource (268 pages)

ISBN 9783030105914 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9783030105907

Print version: Avoine, Gildas Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2021 ISBN 9783030105907

Intro -- Preface -- From the Cryptacus Project to the Cryptacus Book -- Book Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Contributors -- Part I Introduction -- 1 Emerging Security Challenges for Ubiquitous Devices -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Malicious Devices and Watchdog Concept -- 1.2.1 Attacks by Malicious Devices -- 1.2.2 Active Watchdog Concept -- 1.2.3 Solution Strategy -- 1.2.3.1 Commitments: Problems with Solutions Based on Hash Functions -- 1.2.3.2 Commitments Based on Symmetric Encryption -- 1.2.3.3 Encrypted Random Challenge -- 1.2.3.4 Answers to Challenges -- 1.2.3.5 Distance Bounding Protocols -- 1.3 Privacy -- 1.3.1 Symmetric Protocols and Deniability -- 1.3.2 Identity Hiding with Random Key Predistribution -- 1.3.2.1 Key Discovery with a Bloom Filter -- 1.3.2.2 Multiple Shared Keys -- 1.3.2.3 Epoch Keys -- 1.3.3 Overloading Identifiers -- 1.3.4 Pairwise Keys Evolution -- 1.3.5 Transmission with Errors -- 1.4 Conclusion and Future Directions -- Part II Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives -- 2 Catalog and Illustrative Examples of Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Catalog of Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives -- 2.2.1 Block Ciphers -- 2.2.2 Stream Ciphers -- 2.2.3 Hash Functions -- 2.2.4 Message Authentication Codes -- 2.2.5 Authenticated Encryption Schemes -- 2.3 Illustrative Issues in Security Evaluation of Certain Encryption Schemes -- 2.3.1 Reconsidering TMD Tradeoff Attacks for Lightweight Stream Cipher Designs -- 2.3.2 Guess-and-Determine Based Cryptanalysis Employing Dedicated TMD-TO -- 2.3.2.1 Generic Approach -- 2.3.2.2 Summary of Cryptanalysis of Grain-v1 Employing Guess-and-Determine and Dedicated TMD-TO Approaches -- 3 Selected Design and Analysis Techniques for Contemporary Symmetric Encryption -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Keystream Generators with Keyed Update Functions.

11.3.1.1 Configuration Analysis -- 11.3.1.2 Software Version Analysis -- 11.3.2 Static Code Analysis of Firmware Packages -- 11.3.2.1 Code Analysis of Embedded Firmware -- 11.3.2.2 Discovering Backdoors with Static Analysis -- 11.3.2.3 Example Static Analysis to Discover Code Parsers -- 11.4 Dynamic Firmware Analysis -- 11.4.1 Device-Interactive Dynamic Analysis Without Emulation -- 11.4.2 Device-Interactive Dynamic Analysis with Emulation -- 11.4.3 Device-Less Dynamic Analysis and Emulation -- 11.5 Conclusion -- Part V Privacy and Forensics -- 12 Privacy-Oriented Analysis of Ubiquitous Computing Systems: A 5-D Approach -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.1.1 Goal and Plan of the Chapter -- 12.2 Background and Previous Work on Privacy in UCS -- 12.3 5-D Classification and Analysis of Privacy Risks -- 12.3.1 Identity Privacy -- 12.3.2 Query Privacy -- 12.3.3 Location Privacy -- 12.3.4 Footprint Privacy -- 12.3.5 Intelligence Privacy -- 12.4 Future Trends and Challenges -- 12.4.1 Privacy by Design -- 12.4.2 Individual-Centred Privacy -- 12.4.3 Growing Importance of Legislation -- 12.5 Conclusions -- 13 IoT Forensics -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Forensics -- 13.2.1 Digital Device Forensics -- 13.2.2 Other Digital Forensics -- 13.2.3 The Need for IoT Forensics -- 13.3 Challenges in IoT Forensics -- 13.3.1 General Issues -- 13.3.2 Evidence Identification, Collection and Preservation -- 13.3.3 Evidence Analysis and Correlation -- 13.3.4 Presentation -- 13.4 Opportunities of IoT Forensics -- 13.5 An Example of an IoT Forensics Case -- 13.6 Research Overview -- 13.6.1 New Models and Frameworks -- 13.6.2 Preparation Step with Repository -- 13.6.3 Real-World Systems -- 13.7 Conclusion and Future Research Directions -- References.

6.3.3 Biased Output -- 6.3.4 Rotations -- 6.3.5 Vulnerability to Knowledge Accumulation -- 6.3.6 Dubious Proofs of Security: Randomness Tests and Automated Provers -- 6.4 Towards a Sound Approach -- 6.4.1 State of the Literature -- 6.4.2 Promising Avenues -- 6.4.3 The Reductionist Approach -- 6.5 Conclusions -- 7 From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols -- 7.1 An Introduction to Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding -- 7.1.1 Relay Attacks -- 7.1.2 Distance Bounding -- 7.1.3 Other Relay-Countermeasures -- 7.2 Relay Attacks in Practice -- 7.2.1 Basic Relay Strategies -- 7.2.1.1 Purpose-Built Relays -- 7.2.1.2 Off-the-Shelf Relays -- 7.2.2 Advanced Relay Strategies -- 7.2.2.1 Early Send and Late Commit -- 7.2.2.2 Speeding Up the Prover’s Response -- 7.3 Canonical Distance-Bounding Protocols -- 7.3.1 General Structure -- 7.3.2 The Hancke-Kuhn Protocol -- 7.3.3 The Brands-Chaum Protocol -- 7.4 Distance-Bounding Threat Model and Its Formal Treatments -- 7.4.1 Main Threat-Model -- 7.4.1.1 Mafia Fraud (MF) [178] -- 7.4.1.2 Distance Fraud (DF) [113] -- 7.4.1.3 Distance Hijacking (DH) [160] -- 7.4.1.4 Terrorist Fraud (TF) [178] -- 7.4.2 Provable Security and Formal Verification -- 7.4.2.1 Symbolic Verification -- 7.4.2.2 Provable Security -- 7.4.2.3 Provably-(in)Secure Protocols -- 7.5 Distance-Bounding Protocols in Practice -- 7.5.1 NXP’s Mifare Technology -- 7.5.2 3DB Technology -- 7.5.3 Relay-Resistance in EMV -- 7.6 Current Challenges in Distance Bounding -- 7.6.1 Theory vs. Practice -- 7.6.2 Application-Aware DB -- 7.6.3 Specialist Implementations and Slow Adoption -- Part IV Hardware Implementation and Systems -- 8 It Started with Templates: The Future of Profiling in Side-Channel Analysis -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Profiled Side-Channel Attacks -- 8.2.1 Definition of Profiling Attacks -- 8.2.2 Data Preprocessing -- 8.2.3 Feature Engineering.

3.2.1 Design Approach -- 3.2.2 On Continuously Accessing the Key -- 3.2.3 The Stream Ciphers Sprout and Plantlet -- 3.3 A Generic Attack Against Certain Keystream Generators with Keyed Update Functions -- 3.4 Randomized Encryption Employing Homophonic Coding -- 3.4.1 Background -- 3.4.2 Encryption and Decryption -- 3.4.3 Security Evaluation -- 3.5 Conclusion and Future Directions -- 4 An Account of the ISO/IEC Standardization of the Simon and Speck Block Cipher Families -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Simon and Speck -- 4.2.1 Simon -- 4.2.2 Speck -- 4.3 Simon and Speck’s ``Design Rationale’’ -- 4.3.1 Lack of New Information -- 4.3.2 Choice of the Number of Rounds -- 4.3.3 Misquoting Existing Work -- 4.4 The ISO/IEC JTC 1 Standardization Process -- 4.5 The Standardization Process of Simon and Speck in ISO/IEC 29192-2 -- Part III Authentication Protocols -- 5 ePassport and eID Technologies -- 5.1 Application Scenarios -- 5.1.1 Remote vs. Local Use -- 5.1.2 Actors and Scenarios -- 5.1.3 Goals of Protocol Execution -- 5.2 Threats and Security Requirements -- 5.2.1 Assets -- 5.2.2 Threats -- 5.3 Cryptographic Protocols for eIDs -- 5.3.1 Preventing eID Forgeries -- 5.3.2 Enforcing Owner’s Consent -- 5.3.3 EID Authentication and Preventing Cloning -- 5.3.4 Authenticating the Terminal and Its Rights -- 5.3.5 Proof of Interaction -- 5.3.6 Passive Tracing -- 5.3.7 Eavesdropping -- Summary -- 5.4 PKI -- 5.5 Challenges for eID Systems -- 5.6 Future Directions -- 6 Ultra-lightweight Authentication -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.1.1 A Fully Connected World of Small Devices -- 6.1.2 Authentication: Protocol Classification and Physical Constraints -- 6.1.3 Design Challenges -- 6.1.4 Organization of the Chapter -- 6.2 Ultra-lightweight Authentication Protocols -- 6.3 Weaknesses and Pitfalls -- 6.3.1 Poor Diffusion and Linearity -- 6.3.2 Poor Message Composition.

8.3 Template Attacks -- 8.3.1 Context of Template Attack -- 8.3.2 Standard Template Attack -- 8.3.3 Pooled Template Attack -- 8.3.4 Stochastic Attack -- 8.4 Machine Learning-Based Attacks -- 8.4.1 Conducting Sound Machine Learning Analysis -- 8.5 Performance Metrics -- 8.6 Countermeasures Against SCA -- 8.7 Conclusions -- 9 Side Channel Assessment Platforms and Tools for Ubiquitous Systems -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Side Channel Attacks, Leakage Assessment Methods and Problems -- 9.2.1 Side Channel Attack Categories -- 9.2.2 Leakage Assessment Using t-Test -- 9.2.3 Practical Considerations in SCA Trace Collection -- 9.3 Side Channel Attack Trace Collection Platforms -- 9.3.1 Proposing a Fast Trace Collection Approach Beyond the Traditional Model -- 9.4 A Use Case of a Flexible and Fast Platform for DUT SCA Evaluation -- 9.5 Conclusions -- 10 Challenges in Certifying Small-Scale (IoT) Hardware Random Number Generators -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Certification, Standards, and Testing -- 10.3 Challenges in Data Collection -- 10.4 Appropriate Selection of Tests -- 10.4.1 Randomness Testing Under Data Collection Constraints: Analyzing the DESFire EV1 -- 10.4.2 Identifying Issues with Quantum Random Number Generators -- 10.5 Conclusion -- 11 Finding Software Bugs in Embedded Devices -- 11.1 The Challenges of Embedded Devices and Software -- 11.1.1 Lack of Transparency -- 11.1.2 Lack of Control -- 11.1.3 Lack of Resistance to Attacks -- 11.1.4 Organization of This Chapter -- 11.1.5 Classification of Embedded Systems -- 11.2 Obtaining Firmware and Its Components -- 11.2.1 Collecting Firmware Packages -- 11.2.2 Extracting Firmware from Devices -- 11.2.3 Unpacking Firmware -- 11.2.4 Firmware Unpacking Frameworks -- 11.2.5 Modifying and Repacking Firmware -- 11.3 Static Firmware Analysis -- 11.3.1 Simple Static Analysis on Firmware Packages.

001895358

express

(Au-PeEL)EBL6455781

(MiAaPQ)EBC6455781

(OCoLC)1232280332