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The Hague : T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021

1 online resource (313 pages)

ISBN 9789462654716 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9789462654709

Nl Arms Ser.

Print version: Beeres, Robert NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2021 The Hague : T.M.C. Asser Press,c2021 ISBN 9789462654709

3.2 Export Control Regimes -- 3.2.1 The Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral Export Controls -- 3.2.2 Regimes and Treaties -- 3.2.3 Characteristics Regimes.

2.4.3 Arms Production, National Defence Spending and Arms Trade -- 2.4.4 Trading Arms and the Demand for Military Expenditure -- 2.4.5 Arm Your Friends and Save on Defence? -- 2.4.6 Network Interdependencies and the Evolution of the International Arms Trade -- 2.4.7 Research into Major Weapon Systems: What Do We Know? -- 2.5 Small Arms and Light Weapons -- 2.5.1 Weaponomics, the Economics of Small Arms -- 2.5.2 Research into Small Arms and Light Weapons: What Do We Know? -- 2.6 Dual-Use Goods -- 2.6.1 Exporting Weapons of Mass Destruction? -- 2.6.2 Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civil Nuclear Cooperation -- 2.6.3 Research into Dual-Use Goods: What Do We Know? -- 2.7 Analysis -- 2.8 Conclusion: An Agenda for Research -- References -- 3 Export Control Regimes-Present-Day Challenges and Opportunities -- 3.1 Introduction ---

3.2 Export Control Regimes -- 3.2.1 The Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral Export Controls -- 3.2.2 Regimes and Treaties -- 3.2.3 Characteristics Regimes.

Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT) Master Programme -- 1.2.1 Focus of the MSc Programme on CIIMT -- 1.2.2 Learning Styles and Structure of the MSc Programme on CIIMT -- 1.3 Outline of NL ARMS 2021 -- References -- 2 Economics of Arms Trade: What Do We Know? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Research Methodology -- 2.2.1 Scope -- 2.2.2 Selection -- 2.2.3 Research Synthesis -- 2.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction -- 2.3.1 Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements -- 2.3.2 Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset -- 2.3.3 Research on Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Do We Know? -- 2.4 Major Weapon Systems -- 2.4.1 The Gravity of Arms -- 2.4.2 Arming the Embargoed ---

11 Limits on the Extraterritoriality of United States Export Control and Sanctions Legislation -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Jurisdiction of a State -- 11.2.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction -- 11.2.2 Principles of Jurisdiction -- 11.3 United States Export Control Legislation -- 11.3.1 Dual-Use Export Controls -- 11.3.2 Military Export Controls -- 11.3.3 US Economic Sanctions -- 11.4 Analysis -- 11.4.1 Export Controls -- 11.4.2 Sanctions -- 11.5 Synthesis and Conclusion -- References -- 12 Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Initiatives in the International Defense Supply Chain of the F-35 Program -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Theory -- 12.2.1 Transaction Level: Governance as Bilateral Linking -- 12.2.2 Chain Level: Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Mechanisms -- 12.2.3 Theoretical Framework -- 12.3 Methodology -- 12.4 Results -- 12.4.1 Perceived Supply Chain Governance ---

5.2 Export Control Law in General and Terminology -- 5.3 International Law -- 5.3.1 The Law of Armed Conflict -- 5.3.2 The Law of Arms Control -- 5.3.3 Sanctions Law -- 5.3.4 Human Rights Law -- 5.4 Synthesis and Conclusion -- References -- 6 Exploring the Multifaceted Relationship of Compliance and Integrity-The Case of the Defence Industry -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Concepts of Compliance and Integrity -- 6.2.1 Compliance -- 6.2.2 Integrity -- 6.3 Comparing Compliance with Integrity -- 6.4 The Relationship Between Compliance and Integrity -- 6.4.1 Compliance as a Part of Integrity (and Vice Versa) -- 6.4.2 Integrity Versus Compliance -- 6.4.3 Integrity Beyond Compliance -- 6.5 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Do Sanctions Cause Economic Growth Collapses? -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Economic Impact of Sanctions -- 7.2.1 Sanction Process -- 7.2.2 Economic Impact of Sanctions ---

8.3.8 IHS Markit: Jane’s Publications -- 8.3.9 Informa: Aviation Week Network -- 8.3.10 RELX: Cirium -- 8.3.11 Rheinische Post: Flight Global World Air Forces Reports -- 8.3.12 Forecast International: Military Information Library -- 8.3.13 TEAL GROUP: Military Information Library -- 8.3.14 Simplify Compliance: Military Periscope Datasets -- 8.3.15 GlobalData: ADS Solution/Strategic Defense Intelligence Database -- 8.3.16 Frost & -- Sullivan: Aerospace and Defense Content -- 8.4 Analysis -- 8.4.1 Data Providers -- 8.4.2 Type of Data Collected -- 8.4.3 Accessibility: Language -- 8.4.4 Accessibility: Formats -- 8.4.5 Accessibility: Price -- 8.4.6 Time Frame Addressed -- 8.4.7 Actors -- 8.4.8 Weapon System Detail -- 8.4.9 Financial Information Provided -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References -- 9 Does Legal Origin Matter for Arms Control Treaty Ratification? -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Legal Origin and Arms Control Treaties -- 9.3 Data and Methodology ---

13 Effectiveness of Arms Control: The Case of Saudi Arabia -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 A Dashboard for Analyzing the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes -- 13.3 Research Methods -- 13.4 Results -- 13.4.1 Level-1 Effectiveness: Influencing the Behavior of Saudi Arabia -- 13.4.2 Level-2 Effectiveness: The Volume of Weapon Imports into Saudi Arabia -- 13.4.3 Level-3 Effectiveness: The Volume of Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia per Country -- 13.4.4 Level-4 Effectiveness: The Political Will to Implement an Arms Embargo -- 13.5 Conclusions -- References -- 14 Case: Dronebuster -- Handling Non-compliance to ITAR -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Scanning -- 14.3 Analysis -- 14.3.1 Macro-level: Export Control Laws and Regulations for the MoD -- 14.3.2 Meso-level: The EUMS Army -- 14.3.3 Micro-level: Awareness of Individuals -- 14.4 Response -- 14.5 Assessment -- References -- 15 Developing an Adequate Internal Compliance Program for the Royal Netherlands Air Force Command -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Setting the Scene -- 15.2.1 Historical Context -- 15.2.2 PESTL Analysis -- 15.3 The Development of an Internal Compliance Program -- 15.3.1 The Need for an Internal Compliance Program -- 15.3.2 Legal Framework -- 15.3.3 Internal Compliance Program Frameworks and Guidelines -- 15.3.4 The Internal Compliance Program of the Royal Netherlands Air Force Command -- 15.4 Conclusion -- 15.4.1 Summary -- 15.4.2 Consideration -- References -- 16 Arms Exports and Export Control of the Dutch Republic 1585-1621 -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Regulation of Arms Exports -- 16.3 Extent of Exports -- 16.4 Products -- 16.5 Government Arsenals -- 16.6 Trade with the Enemy -- 16.7 Exports to France -- 16.8 Entrepreneurs -- 16.9 Conclusion -- References.

7.4 Results -- 7.4.1 Imposition and Threats -- 7.4.2 Different Types of Sanctions -- 7.5 Conclusions -- References -- 8 Datasets for Combat Aircraft -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Methodology -- 8.3 Results -- 8.3.1 United Nations: UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) -- 8.3.2 United Nations: Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reports -- 8.3.3 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Arms Reports Following the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe -- 8.3.4 European Union (EU): Arms Exports Reports -- 8.3.5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Arms Transfers Database -- 8.3.6 Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) cENTR aNALIZA mIROWOJ tORGOWLI oRUVIEM (camto)]: World Arms Trade Statistics -- 8.3.7 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS): Military Balance ---

11 Limits on the Extraterritoriality of United States Export Control and Sanctions Legislation -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Jurisdiction of a State -- 11.2.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction -- 11.2.2 Principles of Jurisdiction -- 11.3 United States Export Control Legislation -- 11.3.1 Dual-Use Export Controls -- 11.3.2 Military Export Controls -- 11.3.3 US Economic Sanctions -- 11.4 Analysis -- 11.4.1 Export Controls -- 11.4.2 Sanctions -- 11.5 Synthesis and Conclusion -- References -- 12 Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Initiatives in the International Defense Supply Chain of the F-35 Program -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Theory -- 12.2.1 Transaction Level: Governance as Bilateral Linking -- 12.2.2 Chain Level: Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Mechanisms -- 12.2.3 Theoretical Framework -- 12.3 Methodology -- 12.4 Results -- 12.4.1 Perceived Supply Chain Governance ---

12.4.2 An Interpretation of the Memoranda of Understanding -- 12.5 Conclusions and Discussion -- 12.6 Appendix: Export-Related Articles from the PSFD MOU -- References.

5.2 Export Control Law in General and Terminology -- 5.3 International Law -- 5.3.1 The Law of Armed Conflict -- 5.3.2 The Law of Arms Control -- 5.3.3 Sanctions Law -- 5.3.4 Human Rights Law -- 5.4 Synthesis and Conclusion -- References -- 6 Exploring the Multifaceted Relationship of Compliance and Integrity-The Case of the Defence Industry -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Concepts of Compliance and Integrity -- 6.2.1 Compliance -- 6.2.2 Integrity -- 6.3 Comparing Compliance with Integrity -- 6.4 The Relationship Between Compliance and Integrity -- 6.4.1 Compliance as a Part of Integrity (and Vice Versa) -- 6.4.2 Integrity Versus Compliance -- 6.4.3 Integrity Beyond Compliance -- 6.5 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Do Sanctions Cause Economic Growth Collapses? -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Economic Impact of Sanctions -- 7.2.1 Sanction Process -- 7.2.2 Economic Impact of Sanctions ---

7.3 Data and Methodology -- 7.3.1 Growth Collapses and Sanction Data -- 7.3.2 Empirical Model.

8.3.8 IHS Markit: Jane’s Publications -- 8.3.9 Informa: Aviation Week Network -- 8.3.10 RELX: Cirium -- 8.3.11 Rheinische Post: Flight Global World Air Forces Reports -- 8.3.12 Forecast International: Military Information Library -- 8.3.13 TEAL GROUP: Military Information Library -- 8.3.14 Simplify Compliance: Military Periscope Datasets -- 8.3.15 GlobalData: ADS Solution/Strategic Defense Intelligence Database -- 8.3.16 Frost & -- Sullivan: Aerospace and Defense Content -- 8.4 Analysis -- 8.4.1 Data Providers -- 8.4.2 Type of Data Collected -- 8.4.3 Accessibility: Language -- 8.4.4 Accessibility: Formats -- 8.4.5 Accessibility: Price -- 8.4.6 Time Frame Addressed -- 8.4.7 Actors -- 8.4.8 Weapon System Detail -- 8.4.9 Financial Information Provided -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References -- 9 Does Legal Origin Matter for Arms Control Treaty Ratification? -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Legal Origin and Arms Control Treaties -- 9.3 Data and Methodology ---

9.3.1 Treaties and Legal Origin Data -- 9.3.2 Empirical Model -- 9.4 Results.

13 Effectiveness of Arms Control: The Case of Saudi Arabia -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 A Dashboard for Analyzing the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes -- 13.3 Research Methods -- 13.4 Results -- 13.4.1 Level-1 Effectiveness: Influencing the Behavior of Saudi Arabia -- 13.4.2 Level-2 Effectiveness: The Volume of Weapon Imports into Saudi Arabia -- 13.4.3 Level-3 Effectiveness: The Volume of Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia per Country -- 13.4.4 Level-4 Effectiveness: The Political Will to Implement an Arms Embargo -- 13.5 Conclusions -- References -- 14 Case: Dronebuster -- Handling Non-compliance to ITAR -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Scanning -- 14.3 Analysis -- 14.3.1 Macro-level: Export Control Laws and Regulations for the MoD -- 14.3.2 Meso-level: The EUMS Army -- 14.3.3 Micro-level: Awareness of Individuals -- 14.4 Response -- 14.5 Assessment -- References -- 15 Developing an Adequate Internal Compliance Program for the Royal Netherlands Air Force Command -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Setting the Scene -- 15.2.1 Historical Context -- 15.2.2 PESTL Analysis -- 15.3 The Development of an Internal Compliance Program -- 15.3.1 The Need for an Internal Compliance Program -- 15.3.2 Legal Framework -- 15.3.3 Internal Compliance Program Frameworks and Guidelines -- 15.3.4 The Internal Compliance Program of the Royal Netherlands Air Force Command -- 15.4 Conclusion -- 15.4.1 Summary -- 15.4.2 Consideration -- References -- 16 Arms Exports and Export Control of the Dutch Republic 1585-1621 -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Regulation of Arms Exports -- 16.3 Extent of Exports -- 16.4 Products -- 16.5 Government Arsenals -- 16.6 Trade with the Enemy -- 16.7 Exports to France -- 16.8 Entrepreneurs -- 16.9 Conclusion -- References.

3.2.4 National Implementation and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 -- 3.3 Challenges and Opportunities -- 3.3.1 Structural Challenges -- 3.3.2 Recent Challenges -- 3.3.3 Opportunities -- 3.4 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- 4 Case: Non-compliance at Fokker Services -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Scanning -- 4.2.1 Macro-level: Sanctions and World-Wide Competition -- 4.2.2 Meso-level: Intentional Non-compliant Behaviour -- 4.2.3 Micro-level: Deliberate Evasion of Regulation -- 4.2.4 Aftermath -- 4.3 Analysis -- 4.3.1 Tone at the Top -- 4.3.2 Absence of a Compliance Programme -- 4.3.3 Role of Middle Management and the Maintenance and Export Department -- 4.3.4 Conclusion -- 4.4 Response -- 4.4.1 Short-Term Response -- 4.4.2 Long-Term Response -- 4.5 Assessment -- References -- 5 International Export Control Law-Mapping the Field -- 5.1 Introduction ---

7.4 Results -- 7.4.1 Imposition and Threats -- 7.4.2 Different Types of Sanctions -- 7.5 Conclusions -- References -- 8 Datasets for Combat Aircraft -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Methodology -- 8.3 Results -- 8.3.1 United Nations: UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) -- 8.3.2 United Nations: Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reports -- 8.3.3 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Arms Reports Following the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe -- 8.3.4 European Union (EU): Arms Exports Reports -- 8.3.5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Arms Transfers Database -- 8.3.6 Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) cENTR aNALIZA mIROWOJ tORGOWLI oRUVIEM (camto)]: World Arms Trade Statistics -- 8.3.7 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS): Military Balance ---

9.5 Conclusion -- References -- 10 Case: Sharing Parts and Services Among NATO Members -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Scanning -- 10.3 Analysis -- 10.3.1 Macro-level: Fragmentation of the Arms Export Control Laws and Regulations -- 10.3.2 Meso-level: No Institutionalised Compliance Culture Within the NATO -- 10.3.3 Micro-level: Operational Readiness Versus Compliance -- 10.4 Response -- 10.4.1 Leadership Commitment to the Implementation of the Arms Export Controls -- 10.4.2 The NSPA as the Leading NATO Agency to Create a Culture of Compliance -- 10.4.3 Common Agreement on the Basic Rules of Arms Export Controls -- 10.4.4 Formalization of the Implementation of Arms Export Control via STANAGs -- 10.4.5 Periodic Arms Export Controls Training to Member States’ Personnel -- 10.5 Assessment -- References ---

001895963

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(Au-PeEL)EBL6730701

(MiAaPQ)EBC6730701

(OCoLC)1314625675