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Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2022

1 online resource (398 pages)

ISBN 9783030944032 (electronic bk.)

ISBN 9783030944025

Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion Ser.

Print version: Loke, Andrew The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022 ISBN 9783030944025

3.2 Objection: The Initial State of Reality (ISOR) is the Only Thing That Begins Uncaused -- 3.3 Against 1.1.1. Brute Fact -- 3.4 Against 1.1.2. Abstract Entities -- 3.5 Against 1.1.3.1 S is a Property of x -- 3.6 Concerning 1.1.3.2.1 -- 3.7 Concerning 1.1.3.2.2. S is a Property of y -- 3.8 Concerning 1.1.3.2.3. S is a Property of the Circumstances of y -- 3.8.1 Objection: Current Spatial Considerations Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now -- 3.8.2 Objection Based on the Distinction between Different Senses of Beginning to Exist -- 3.8.3 Objection: Pre-existing Things Such as a Pre-existent Law of Nature Might Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now -- 3.8.4 A Second Form of Modus Tollens Argument -- 3.9 Objection Concerning the Distinction between Could and Would ---

3.10 Objection: The Causal Principle is Inconsistent with Libertarian Freedom -- 3.11 Objection Based on Lack of Directionality -- 3.12 Epistemological Objections -- 3.13 Conclusion -- Bibliography.

3.2 Objection: The Initial State of Reality (ISOR) is the Only Thing That Begins Uncaused -- 3.3 Against 1.1.1. Brute Fact -- 3.4 Against 1.1.2. Abstract Entities -- 3.5 Against 1.1.3.1 S is a Property of x -- 3.6 Concerning 1.1.3.2.1 -- 3.7 Concerning 1.1.3.2.2. S is a Property of y -- 3.8 Concerning 1.1.3.2.3. S is a Property of the Circumstances of y -- 3.8.1 Objection: Current Spatial Considerations Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now -- 3.8.2 Objection Based on the Distinction between Different Senses of Beginning to Exist -- 3.8.3 Objection: Pre-existing Things Such as a Pre-existent Law of Nature Might Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now -- 3.8.4 A Second Form of Modus Tollens Argument -- 3.9 Objection Concerning the Distinction between Could and Would ---

The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- 1: Introducing the Quest for an Explanation -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 A Review of the Discussion -- 1.3 Problems with Scientism -- 1.4 Problems with Verificationism -- 1.5 In Defence of the Possibility of a Priori Metaphysical Knowledge -- 1.6 Reply to the Evolutionary Objection Against Metaphysical Knowledge -- 1.7 Reply to Empiricist Objections -- 1.8 Conclusion and Overview of Following Chapters -- Bibliography -- 2: Causation and Laws of Nature -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Defining the Key Terms of the Causal Principle -- 2.3 Causation, Fundamental Physics, and Laws of Nature -- 2.4 Considerations of Quantum Indeterminancy -- Bibliography -- 3: Arguments for the Causal Principle -- 3.1 Introduction ---

5.2 Scientific Issues -- 5.3 Introducing the Philosophical Arguments Against an Infinite Regress of Causes and Events -- 5.4 Argument Against Traversing an Actual Infinite -- 5.5 The Argument from the Viciousness of Dependence Regress -- 5.6 Can a First Cause Be Avoided by a Causal Loop? -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 6: What the First Cause Is -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The First Cause Is Uncaused, Beginningless, and Initially Changeless -- 6.3 Transcendent and Immaterial -- 6.4 The First Cause Has Libertarian Freedom -- 6.4.1 How Could the First Cause Bring about the First Event from an Initially Changeless State -- 6.4.2 Should We Call It Libertarian Freedom? -- 6.4.3 Is the First Event Random? -- 6.4.4 Libertarian Freedom and Time -- 6.4.5 Contradiction with Classical Theism -- 6.5 The First Cause Has Tremendous Power -- 6.6 Conclusion ---

4: Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Fine-Tuning and Orderliness -- 4.2.1 Fine-Tuning -- 4.2.2 Orderliness -- 4.2.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2.2 Objection: Human Creation -- 4.2.2.3 Platonic Objection -- 4.2.3 Summary -- 4.3 A Logically Exhaustive List of Categories of Possibilities -- 4.4 Chance Hypothesis -- 4.4.1 The Argument from Selection Bias and Chaos -- 4.4.2 Anthropic Principle -- 4.4.3 Improbable Event Happens -- 4.4.4 The Problem of Normalizing Probabilities -- 4.4.5 Multiple Universes -- 4.4.5.1 Introducing Various Types of Multiverse Hypothesis -- 4.4.5.2 Insufficient Evidence for the Atheistic Multiverse Hypothesis -- 4.4.5.3 Arguments against the Atheistic Multiverse Hypothesis -- 4.5 Regularity -- 4.6 Combination of Regularity and Chance -- 4.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 5: Arguments for a First Cause -- 5.1 Introduction ---

5.2 Scientific Issues -- 5.3 Introducing the Philosophical Arguments Against an Infinite Regress of Causes and Events -- 5.4 Argument Against Traversing an Actual Infinite -- 5.5 The Argument from the Viciousness of Dependence Regress -- 5.6 Can a First Cause Be Avoided by a Causal Loop? -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 6: What the First Cause Is -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The First Cause Is Uncaused, Beginningless, and Initially Changeless -- 6.3 Transcendent and Immaterial -- 6.4 The First Cause Has Libertarian Freedom -- 6.4.1 How Could the First Cause Bring about the First Event from an Initially Changeless State -- 6.4.2 Should We Call It Libertarian Freedom? -- 6.4.3 Is the First Event Random? -- 6.4.4 Libertarian Freedom and Time -- 6.4.5 Contradiction with Classical Theism -- 6.5 The First Cause Has Tremendous Power -- 6.6 Conclusion ---

Bibliography -- 7: Ultimate Design -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Against the ’Uncaused’ Hypothesis.

4: Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Fine-Tuning and Orderliness -- 4.2.1 Fine-Tuning -- 4.2.2 Orderliness -- 4.2.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2.2 Objection: Human Creation -- 4.2.2.3 Platonic Objection -- 4.2.3 Summary -- 4.3 A Logically Exhaustive List of Categories of Possibilities -- 4.4 Chance Hypothesis -- 4.4.1 The Argument from Selection Bias and Chaos -- 4.4.2 Anthropic Principle -- 4.4.3 Improbable Event Happens -- 4.4.4 The Problem of Normalizing Probabilities -- 4.4.5 Multiple Universes -- 4.4.5.1 Introducing Various Types of Multiverse Hypothesis -- 4.4.5.2 Insufficient Evidence for the Atheistic Multiverse Hypothesis -- 4.4.5.3 Arguments against the Atheistic Multiverse Hypothesis -- 4.5 Regularity -- 4.6 Combination of Regularity and Chance -- 4.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 5: Arguments for a First Cause -- 5.1 Introduction ---

7.3 In defence of Design -- 7.4 Reply to Hume’s Classic Objections -- 7.5 Addressing an Objection to Argument by Exclusion -- 7.6 Response to Difficulties Concerning Determining the Prior Probability that God Design the Universe -- 7.7 Reply to Objections Concerning the Range of Explanatory Latitude -- 7.8 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 8: Ultimate Designer -- 8.1 Summary of Important Conclusions from Previous Chapters -- 8.2 Concerning the God-of-the-Gaps Objection -- 8.3 Limitations of the KCA-TA and responses -- 8.4 Significance of the Conclusion of KCA-TA -- Bibliography -- Bibliography -- Index.

001896948

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(Au-PeEL)EBL6970721

(MiAaPQ)EBC6970721

(OCoLC)1314608899